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In the last years, there has been an increasing adoption of automated systems to
trade ﬁnancial securities (see Domowitz and Steil, 1999 for a taxonomy of automated
systems). In these settings trading occurs through an electronic order book without
involving ﬁnancial intermediaries. Automated systems offer advantages in terms of
operating and trading costs, but they depend on public limit orders for the provision
of liquidity. The time variation in liquidity can affect the evolution of prices, and
complex dynamics can arise between measures of market trading activity and
measures of market volatility. This topic has been addressed by Domowitz in a series
of papers analyzing the market behavior of real electronic markets (e.g., Coppejans
et al., 2001; Domowitz and El-Gamal, 1999; Domowitz and Wang, 2002).
In this paper, we simulate an artiﬁcial electronic market where optimizing
portfolio traders with imperfect information adjust their positions over time on the
basis of the new public information becoming available.
The present work extends the model developed in Consiglio et al. (2005)
introducing endogenous target individual portfolio holdings. In our previous paper
we analyzed the impact on price changes of the trading mechanism by modeling an
economy populated by agents homogeneous in terms of trading strategies. Each
agent traded to reach an exogenously assigned target portfolio. We showed that the
institutional setting of a double-auction market may by itself generate non-normal
univariate marginal distributions of assets’ returns and temporal patterns resembling
those observed in real markets (such as serial dependence in volatility and in trading
volume). Moreover, we analyzed the role played by the order-type submission
strategy specifying a setting where agents selected the type of order to submit using
the information revealed by the state of the book. We showed that the state of the
book provides an implicit coordination device inducing agents to supply liquidity
when the market needs it.
In this paper we introduce a scenario optimization model to determine
endogenously individual portfolio allocations. That is, agents are not anymore
noise traders whose trading is driven by exogenous liquidity shocks. On the contrary,
here we assign cognitive abilities to the agents. Each agent, given the joint
distribution of asset returns, his initial endowment, and a target wealth growth rate
to reach within his investment horizon, will select the portfolio that maximizes his
objective function, and, over time, will trade to reach his optimal portfolio.
The main ingredients of the model are the objective function used by the agents to
select the optimal portfolio, the assumption of incomplete information, and the
design of the trading mechanism.
We depart from the full rationality hypothesis assigning to the investors prospect-
type preferences. That is, we deﬁne the investors objective function in terms of
ﬁnancial wealth ﬂuctuations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Additionally, we
assume that agents do not know the stochastic process driving the fundamentals and
they must learn recursively the unknown data generating process. We operationalize
the idea of structural uncertainty allowing agents to hold arbitrary priors about the
univariate marginal distribution of returns, and we make agents update correctly
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constant common view of the assets’ association structure, and that they correctly
apply a copula function to generate the joint distribution of returns to be used to
determine the optimal portfolio allocations. The copula-approach allows to study
separately the impact of a learning process about each single component of the
multivariate distribution of returns (the univariate marginals and the association
structure). This separability is particularly useful considering that in real ﬁnancial
markets the assets’ association structure typically appears much less volatile in the
short run than the marginal distributions of returns. In this paper, we assign to the
agents a relatively short investment horizon (not longer than one year), and,
therefore, we restrict the learning process to the univariate marginals assuming that
the assets’ dependence structure does not change and it is known by the agents.
The paper is related to the recent literature trying to highlight the economic
mechanisms generating typical asset-pricing anomalies such as the heavy tails of the
unconditional distribution of returns, the predictability of returns, the excess
volatility, and the phenomenon of volatility clustering (see Barberis, 2000; Barberis
et al., 2001; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Bossaerts, 1999; Brennan and Xia, 2001;
Guidolin and Timmermann, 2007; Lewellen and Shanken, 2002; Timmermann, 1993;
Xia, 2001. Pagan (1996) provides a survey of the empirical evidence on ﬁnancial
markets). The theoretical work trying to explain ﬁnancial market anomalies can be
divided into two different strands. On one hand, we have papers relaxing the
assumption of individual rationality either through the belief-formation process or
through the decision-making process. Alternatively, a growing number of papers has
been focusing on exploring the consequences of relaxing the assumption of
consistent (or correct) beliefs while maintaining the assumption of individual
rationality. In both cases the dynamics of asset prices have been studied assuming
one representative agent and/or a ﬁnancial market where one single risky asset is
exchanged.
In this paper, we overcome both these limitations building an artiﬁcial ﬁnancial
market populated by heterogeneous investors who can trade several risky assets (see
Hommes, 2005 for a recent survey on heterogeneous agent models). We combine the
two strands of literature designing a market where agents’ heterogeneity depends on
the assumption of incomplete information, and, at the same time, investors’
preferences are, more realistically, deﬁned over ﬁnancial gains and losses rather than
over ﬁnal absolute wealth positions. Among all the non-expected utility theories,
prospect theory has been very successful at capturing the experimental results. The
theory is purely descriptive and does not have normative content. Thus,
theoretically, there is no correct way to combine prospect-type preferences with
learning. Any ad hoc speciﬁcation for the learning process can be used. We have
chosen to avoid any additional element of irrationality deﬁning an efﬁcient learning
process based on bayesian updating.
The third layer of the model is the continuous double-auction trading mechanism.
In this setting agents enter the market sequentially and transactions occur when two
agents can match their request at a given price. Therefore, whenever an agent cannot
ﬁnd a matching order, or the size of the matching order is lower than the required
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terms of price dynamics. Prices may not adjust to fully incorporate information/
shocks as expressed by the trading requests, and, therefore, they may tend to be
stickier and to generate returns more concentrated around the mean. In addition,
rationing may increase the probability of having sequences of traders on the same
side of the market, and that in turn may imply a higher frequency of extreme price
movements with respect to the average price change (see Consiglio et al., 2005;
Li Calzi and Pellizzari, 2003).
In this paper we focus the attention on the interactions between market liquidity
and the volatility of price changes and we try to understand how those interactions
are affected by the learning process.
We show that the automated auction market system with learning agents
generates irregular price series characterized by sharp increases and decreases
(looking like bubbles and crashes). We provide evidence supporting the hypothesis
that the irregularities of the price process are related to the variability of market
liquidity, interpreted in terms of the ability of the system to sustain sufﬁcient contra-
side order activity. Moreover, we provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that
the parameters characterizing the learning process affect signiﬁcantly the evolution
of market liquidity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the market structure.
Section 3 introduces the assumptions we make in terms of agents’ behavior. Section 4
presents the calibration used for our simulations and discusses the results obtained.
Section 5 concludes.2. The market setting
We consider an economy with M agents and N risky assets. The market works as
a double-auction automated system. Agents, trading to reach their own target
portfolio, enter the market sequentially. At each time step k within a trading day t,
we randomly extract, with replacement, one agent to enter the market. The selected
agent will enter the market, and he will post his orders, if PiðEÞ is greater than a
random number drawn from a uniform distribution over the ½0; 1 interval. The
probability PiðEÞ is an increasing function of the total imbalance between the target
and the current portfolio,
PiðEÞ ¼ f ðDiÞ, (1)
with
Di ¼
XN
j¼1
hijðt; t þ tÞ 
xtijðkÞPtjðkÞ
W tiðkÞ

,
where hijðt; t þ tÞ is the agent’s optimal target allocation for asset j, xtijðkÞ represents
the agent’s current holding in asset j, PtjðkÞ is the current price for asset j, and W tiðkÞ
is the agent’s total wealth given current prices and agent’s holdings. The activation
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more impatient to trade the more distant is their current wealth allocation from their
target portfolio. Correspondingly, the ﬁltering device PiðEÞ makes the effective
probability of entering the market dependent on portfolio’s imbalance.
When a trader enters the market he faces an exchange book with orders to buy and
to sell. Agents can trade immediately at the current quotes placing market orders, or
they can submit limit orders that are stored in the exchange book and that will be
executed if matching orders will arrive before the end of the trading day. Limit
orders will be executed using ﬁrst price priority and then time precedence. At each
moment in time during the day, the exchange book, divided in a buy side and a sell
side, shows all the orders that have been issued up to that time and that have not
found a matching order. For each order, the order size, the limit price, and the
posting time are reported. The limit price is the maximum price that an agent is
willing to pay to purchase the registered quantity in the case of a buy order, and the
minimum price that an agent is willing to accept to sell the submitted quantity in the
case of a sell order. Limit order prices are ordered from the highest to the lowest on
the buy side, and from the lowest to the highest on the sell side. Prices move in
discrete steps, and, during each trading day, the minimum tick size depends on the
daily opening price. At the end of the trading day all orders are canceled. At each
time step k, the spot price is either the last transaction price, or the last midquote if a
change in the quotes occurred.3. The agents’ behavior
The agents’ behavior is speciﬁed in terms of order ﬂow strategy (number of units
to buy or to sell) and order-type submission strategy (market or limit order).
Agents trade to rebalance their portfolio. That is, at each moment in time they
trade to adjust their portfolio according to their optimal target allocations. At time
step k during trading day t, the number of units of the jth asset that the ith agent is
willing to trade is given by
qtijðkÞ ¼
hijðt; t þ tÞW tiðkÞ  xtijðkÞPtjðkÞ
PtjðkÞ
$ %
, (2)
where bc denotes the integer part. If qtijðkÞ40, the trader issues a buy order; if
qtijðkÞo0, the trader issues a sell order. The target allocations hijðt; t þ tÞ, where t
represents the length of the investment horizon, are the optimal solutions of the
agent’s portfolio choice problem. Agents are cash constrained. In particular,
borrowing and short selling are not allowed and the agent’s orders can be submitted
only if the money needed ðMNÞ is not greater than the money available ðMAÞ:
MNiðkÞ ¼
XN
j¼1
I
j
fMBgðkÞq0jðkÞAjðkÞ þ
XN
j¼1
I
j
fLBgðkÞ½qijðkÞ  q0jðkÞPj;bðkÞ, (3)
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XN
j¼1
I
j
fMSgðkÞq0jðkÞBjðkÞ; 1 (4)
where I
j
fAgðkÞ is an indicator variable denoting for each risky asset j if the agent wants
to issue an order; q0jðkÞ is the minimum between the quantity that the agents want to
trade at current prices, qijðkÞ, and the quantity available at the current quote, QjðkÞ;
and CiðkÞ is the cash available to the ith agent. The event A can be a market order to
buy (MB), a limit order to buy (LB), or a market order to sell. If MNiðkÞpMAiðkÞ,
then all the orders that the agent wants to issue will be submitted. If
MNiðkÞ4MAiðkÞ, then for each asset j the number of units to trade is scaled down
until MNiðkÞ ¼ MAiðkÞ. The quantity adjustment keeps constant, with respect to the
total, the percentage of money to allocate in each asset. Note that, for each asset, the
number of shares to purchase is computed as the integer part of the product of the
original number of shares and the ratio between the money available and the money
needed. The residual generated by the rounding procedure is automatically
converted in cash.
The adjustments imposed by the budget constraint are performed giving priority
to the submission of market orders to buy. Only if some money remains available
after all market orders to buy have been processed, the procedure to check for the
availability of money for submitting the desired limit orders to buy starts. Otherwise,
the limit orders to buy are all canceled.
For simplicity, in the current model the order submission criterion is exogenously
speciﬁed. In particular, we assume that traders want to satisfy their trading needs as
soon as possible, and, thus, they will submit a market order at the current quote for
the quantity they need to trade. Limit orders are used only if for some j the
corresponding qtijðkÞ is greater than the quantity available at the current quote. In
this case the agent places a market order for the quantity available, and for the
residual quantity, given by qtijðkÞ  QtjðkÞ, he will submit a limit order. The associated
limit price will be such that the order will be ﬁrst on the appropriate side of the book,
so we have that,
Ptj;bðkÞ ¼ BtjðkÞ þ t,
Ptj;sðkÞ ¼ AtjðkÞ  t.
where BtjðkÞ and AtjðkÞ are, respectively, the best bid and the best ask in the order
book, and t is the minimum tick size for trading day t. When there are no orders on
the relevant side of the book to match with, the agent will place directly a limit order
for the whole quantity needed, qtijðkÞ, at a price that will make him ﬁrst on the book.
Observe that, the order fractioning rule that we impose is necessary to maintain a
viable market with a regular ﬂow of market and limit orders. In fact, an economy
populated by portfolio traders placing market orders until exhaustion of the orders
stored in the book will produce a degenerate market where one of the two sides of
the book is systematically empty. In any case, the very simple rule of transforming1To simplify the notation we drop the superscript indicating the trading day.
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instance, this is the procedure used in the automated Milan Stock Exchange.
3.1. The learning process
We assume that investors have incomplete information about the joint
distribution of returns, and that they must learn about the unknown returns
generating process using the available information. In particular, we allow
agents to hold arbitrary marginal prior densities for the assets’ returns. We use a
multinomial model to represent agents’ views about the univariate distributions
of returns. For each asset, we divide the support of the returns distribution in
C classes, representing the number of possible events at each trial. At each instant
in time, one of the C possible events will occur. Assuming a stationary and
independent process, the prior marginal returns distribution of each asset can be
modeled as a Dirichlet with parameters ða1; . . . ; aCÞ; see Appendix A for a detailed
description of the procedure that we follow to assign the parameters of the prior
distributions. Thus, we assign to the agents populating our economy arbitrary prior
densities given by
f ijðyÞ ¼
Gðaij1 þ    þ aijCÞ
Gðaij1Þ   GðaijCÞ
yaij111 ; . . . ; y
aijC1
C ,
XC
c¼1
yc ¼ 1 and y1; . . . ; yCX0, ð5Þ
where i ¼ 1; . . . ; M, and j ¼ 1; . . . ; N. The prior distribution can be interpreted as
containing information equivalent to
PC
c¼1aijc (aijc observations for each class).
Agents will use the history of realized market returns to update their beliefs in a
bayesian fashion. Letting ujc be the number of returns observed, for the jth asset, in
class c during the time period between two successive updating days, the posterior
distribution of the ith agent for the returns of asset j will be Dirichlet with parameters
ððaij1 þ uij1Þ; . . . ; ðaijC þ uijCÞÞ. In this setting the learning speed of the system is
inversely related to the summation of the aijc. The higher is the summation of the aijc
(stronger views), the smaller is the effect of new information represented by the
summation of the uijc. Since agents use common public information, the updating
mechanism will tend to homogenize the agents’ views. The ratio between the
summation of the aijc and the summation of the uijc controls the speed with which the
market switches from heterogenous to homogenous views.
To determine the optimal portfolio composition, agents should know the joint
probability distribution of assets returns. We assume that agents share a common
constant view of the securities’ association structure, and that they correctly use a
copula function to generate the N-variate returns distribution from their arbitrary set
of N univariate distributions. A copula is a function C : ½0; 1N ! ½0; 1, which
connects a set of univariate distributions into a joint distribution. In particular,
Sklar’s theorem implies that any continuous N-dimensional distribution F may be
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given by
CF ðu1; . . . ; uNÞ ¼ F ðF11 ðu1Þ; . . . ; F1N ðuNÞÞ, (6)
where un 2 ½0; 1 for all n. Thus, a copula describes the association structure of F
irrespective of its univariate marginals (see Nelsen, 1999). That is, the main
advantage of using copulas to model a joint distribution is that the univariate
marginals and the association structure can be modeled separately and then
combined to get the joint distribution. In our context, introducing a copula function
allows us to concentrate our attention on modeling agents’ heterogeneity in terms of
arbitrary prior univariate marginal distributions of assets’ returns. We use a
Gaussian copula2 to model the dependence structure between the risky asset:
Crðu1; . . . ; uNÞ ¼ FrðF1ðu1Þ; . . . ;F1ðuNÞÞ, (7)
where r denotes the set of the NðN  1Þ=2 bivariate correlation coefﬁcients, Fr is the
standardized multivariate normal distribution with correlation matrix r, and F is the
standard univariate normal. Using the copula, agents obtain the joint distribution of
returns and extract from it a number S of scenarios. Each scenario speciﬁes a return
for each of the N risky assets for all the time periods in the investment horizon of the
agent. Every scenario represents a possible future realization of returns, for the N
assets, given the agent’s joint probability distribution. Agents use the S extracted
scenarios to determine the optimal composition of their portfolio.3.2. The portfolio model
We use a prospect-type utility function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to model
the portfolio choice problem. Each investor has an initial level of wealth and a target
growth rate to reach within his investment horizon. The investor must determine an
asset allocation strategy so that the portfolio growth rate will be sufﬁcient to reach
the target. We model the utility function in terms of ﬂuctuations, measured at regular
intervals, of the portfolio rate of return with respect to the speciﬁed target growth
rate, and we assume that investors are more sensitive to downside movements. Our
approach is inspired to the descriptive models about investors’ choices used by
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. (2001). The target portfolio holdings
are determined using the scenario optimization model developed in Consiglio et al.
(2004); see Appendix B for an overview of the model.
Let ~ut and ~dt be two random variables which deﬁne the upsides and the downsides
in each time period t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T . The random variable ~DT which accounts for the
2Recently Malevergne and Sornette (2003), using a sample of 22 stocks with high market capitalization
traded on the NYSE, have tested the hypothesis that the association between stocks can be modeled by the
Gaussian copula. They found that the ‘Gaussian copula provides the most parsimonious description of the
dependence between stock returns, apart from crisis periods’. The Gaussian copula underestimates the tail
dependence, but, as stressed by the authors, the estimates of tail dependence obtained under alternative
assumptions, like the Student copula, are not substantially improved.
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~DT ¼
XT
t¼1
~dt. (8)
Correspondingly, the upsides collected during the planning horizon are added up
to deﬁne the random variable representing the ﬁnal surplus
~UT ¼
XT
t¼1
~ut. (9)
The investor will determine his optimal portfolio by solving the following
multiobjective programming model
Maximize
h
E½ ~UT   lE½ ~DT  ð10Þ
Subject to h 2H, ð11Þ
where l40 is a coefﬁcient capturing aversion to losses.
As shown in Appendix B, by representing the probability distributions of the asset
returns through a set of scenarios, the reward and the risk function formulated here
turn out to be linear (see Dembo and Rosen, 1999 for useful insights about bilinear
utility functions for portfolio management).4. Results
4.1. Simulation parameters
We deﬁne a setting where agents are equal in terms of endowments, trading
strategies, investment horizons, institutional constraints, and type of information
used to update prior beliefs. The main source of heterogeneity is given by the
different set of prior univariate marginal distributions of returns that we assign to
each group of agents.
We run our simulations with a population of M ¼ 6000 potentially active traders,
T ¼ 2400 trading days, and N ¼ 3 risky assets. Each trading day is divided in K ¼
360 time steps corresponding to a trading day of 6 h, assuming a time step k equal to
1min. Every agent gets an initial endowment in each of the three stocks of our
economy of 50 shares, and a cash endowment of Ci ¼ 1000h. Initial prices are set
equal to 100h. Agents are divided in G ¼ 12 equally sized groups. All agents have the
same perception about the assets’ association structure; in Appendix E we reports
the correlation matrices that we used in the simulations. Additionally, all agents in a
group share the same view about the marginal distributions of returns. We create
heterogeneity assigning to each group of agents a different set of prior univariate
marginal distributions of returns. We divide the population into pessimists and
optimists. That is, we assume that the univariate marginal priors reﬂect agents
expectations about market conditions. A group of pessimistic agents will have a set
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while a group of optimists will have priors with modes shifted towards the upper end
of the returns interval (see Appendix A).
All agents have the same type of objective function, the same investment horizon
(H ¼ 120; 240 days), and the same dealing frequency (f ¼ 5 days). We assign a
different l to each group. In particular, the coefﬁcient capturing aversion to losses
ranges between a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 9:5, and goes up in steps of 0:5
points moving from the ﬁrst to the last group; the ﬁrst six groups are optimists, while
the last six are pessimists. So the assigned parameter l makes the pessimistic agents
more sensitive to losses. The target growth rate of return, gi, is different between
pessimistic and optimistic agents: gi ¼ 1:5% for pessimists and gi ¼ 3% for agents
with optimistic views. To maintain an active market over time, we simulate a setting
where agents have not entered the market at the same time. In practice, we assume
that every I ¼ H=G days, one group reaches the end of his investment horizon, and
all the agents in the group update their view about the joint distribution of returns
using the history of observed returns. The posterior distribution of returns is then
used to determine new optimal target allocations hijðt; t þ tÞ. We create a price
history that agents can use the ﬁrst time they need to update their priors, running our
simulations for the ﬁrst H days using randomly assigned target allocation vectors. In
particular, during the initial period each group of agents gets target allocation
vectors sampled from a Dirichlet ð1; . . . ; 1; 1Þ. To maintain, over the entire length of
the simulations, a market structure homogeneous in terms of trading activity, during
the initial period, we extract randomly one group of agents every I ¼ H=G days, and
we assign to all the agents in the selected group a new set of randomly extracted
target allocations.
The probability of entering the market, PiðEÞ ¼ f ðDiÞ, has a stretched S-shaped
functional form. The function is calibrated to get an entering probability equal to
one when the total imbalance is at least 50%. The minimum tick size is 1% of the
opening daily price. In Appendix E, we report a summary of the parameters used in
the simulations; the artiﬁcial market is developed in C++, and the optimization
model is solved trough calls to GAMS.4.2. Price dynamics
As a base case we assume that agents have an investment horizon of 240 days, and
equivalent prior sample information equal to 400 observations. We run different
simulations where we change the correlation matrix, while we maintain constant all
the other parameters and the seed number. Precisely, we run one simulation for each
combination of the parameters.
Fig. 1 displays the dynamics of daily prices generated by the optimal target
allocations determined changing the dependence of assets’ returns. In panel a (b) of
Fig. 1, we plot the price series corresponding to the case where agents assume that
there exists a negative (positive) association structure among the three risky assets.
The daily price series report for each day the last transaction price (LTP) registered
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Fig. 1. Daily time series of transaction prices for the settings with H ¼ 240 andPcaic ¼ 400. In panel a,
we plot the series relative to the case of optimal allocations determined assuming negative correlations
among the assets. In panel b, we show the series relative to the case of optimal allocations determined
assuming positive correlations among the assets.
A. Consiglio, A. Russino / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1910–19371920during the trading day. We plot the ﬁrst 1000 daily prices after the initializing period
of 240 days.
Comparing panel a and b, we notice that the correlation matrix assumed by the
agents changes signiﬁcantly the price dynamics. Both settings, generate price
patterns characterized by sharp up and down movements, but the jumps appear to
be more pronounced in the price series generated under a positive association
structure. Following Domowitz and El-Gamal (1999), we conjecture that the
observed irregularities in the price process can be explained in terms of lack of
liquidity. In an automated auction system, the liquidity of the market depends on the
interaction between the bid queue and the sell queue. Clearly, the ability of the
trading mechanism to pair the desires of buyers and sellers depends on the process
generating the order ﬂow. Thus, we ﬁrst analyze how the evolution of optimal target
allocations is affected by the parameters deﬁning the learning process.
Fig. 2 shows the behavior of the agents’ optimal allocations for asset 1 over time.
We plot the mean and the standard deviation of the portfolio allocations across 12
groups.
When agents assume that the assets’ returns are negatively correlated, they will be
induced to reduce the risk of ﬂuctuations of their portfolio returns below the target
increasing diversiﬁcation. As displayed in the upper panel of Fig. 2, the optimal
target allocations will show relatively low variability across agents and over time. In
addition, assets’ returns will tend to be equally positively correlated. On the other
hand, when agents assume that assets’ returns are positively correlated, optimal asset
allocations will be mainly driven by the agents beliefs about the univariate marginal
distributions of returns. For each asset, the optimal target allocations will show high
variability across agents and over time (see the lower panel of Fig. 2), reﬂecting
agents’ heterogeneity in terms of prior marginals. Assets’ demands will tend to be
more concentrated on one single asset, and that, in turn, will increase the probability
of having an accumulation of orders on one side of the book. Thus, a positive
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two subsequent updating periods, fast upward changes will generate selling
waves. Note that, in our framework agents trade to rebalance their portfolio.
When fast movements in prices occur in a time period short enough to
maintain constant the target allocations, agents tend to act as contrarian
traders: for given target allocations, they sell when prices go up and they buy
when prices go down ðqqtijðkÞ=qPtjðkÞo0Þ. Diversiﬁcation will be mostly
conﬁned to the assets with the lowest positive correlation driving up the returns’
correlation of those assets. Observe that, in our market, populated by portfolio
traders, to generate negative correlations between assets returns we should have
information shocks that change the agents’ perceptions about the parameters of the
univariate marginal returns distributions, and that induce agents to shift from one
subset of assets to another. But, once agents assume that assets returns are negatively
correlated their optimal allocation strategy will generate positively correlated assets
returns.
In Fig. 3 we compare the evolution of prices and of mean target allocations for
asset 1, generated under positive returns’ correlations and two different investment
horizons H ¼ 240; 120; to maintain constant the proportion between new data and
equivalent prior sample data, we assume that
PC
c¼1aic ¼ 200 when H ¼ 120.
Both settings generate strong irregularities in the price series that are associated
with the variability of the average target allocations over time. But the sharpest up
and down movements of asset prices do not seem related to sudden changes in the
optimal portfolio weights. We argue that the instability of the price series is related
to the inability of the trading mechanism to sustain a balanced order book, and that
the parameters governing the learning process affect the time variation in the
liquidity of the order book.4.3. Trading activity and market liquidity
To verify our conjecture about the relationship between the irregularities in the
price series and the variations in market liquidity, we compare three setting: N-400-240, base case with Pcaic ¼ 400 and investment horizon H ¼ 240,
assuming negative correlations; P-400-240, same as above, but assuming positive correlations;P P-200-120, short horizon case (H ¼ 120) with caic ¼ 200, assuming positive
correlations.The liquidity (or depth) of a ﬁnancial market is a complex concept that can be
measured in several ways. In general, the liquidity of the market affects the
relationship between the trading volume and the volatility of price changes. Many
theoretical models establish a positive link between volume and volatility, and relate
the intensity of the relation to market liquidity. That is, an increase in market
liquidity should decrease the sensitivity of volatility to volume.
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measuring the impact of each transaction in terms of price changes. We name this
variable VRET. The variable is computed dividing the absolute value of daily logarithmic
price changes by the daily number of transactions.
Table 1 contains daily summary descriptive statistics for the three settings. We report
a set of variables measuring the intensity of trading activity (for the market as a whole
and for the buy and sell side separately), and two variables related to price changes.
Most of the variables measuring the trading activity indicate that there is a clear
hierarchy between the three settings. The trading volume, the number of
transactions, the average length of the queues, and the average depths of the two
sides of the market are higher in the settings generated assuming positive
correlations, and, between those two settings, they are higher in the short
horizon case. These results are in line with our previous considerations. The
positive correlations’ settings generate high heterogeneity of the optimal target
allocations across agents, and high variability of the optimal weights over time.
The temporal variability of the optimal weights increases in the short horizon case,
where agents are more inﬂuenced by short run market movements. Clearly, the
intensity of trading activity is related to the agents’ heterogeneity. As expected, the
volatility of price changes is higher in the settings where the trading volume is higher
(in P-200-120 the standard deviation of LR is 0:12, while in N-400-240 is equal
to 0:08).
But, if we look at the ability of the market to absorb trading without big jumps in
prices, measured by VRET, we get a different picture: the average per-transaction
volatility is higher in the long horizon settings and it has the highest value in the long
horizon setting with positive correlations. The pattern of VRET is similar to the
pattern of the average waiting time between transactions. Thus, there is no obvious
relation between the intensity of the market trading activity and the per-transaction
volatility of price changes.
The relation between the per-transaction jumps in prices and the average length of
time between two transactions suggests that those jumps should be associated with
an accumulation of orders on one side of the book. We create two variables DQ and
DD measuring, respectively, the unbalance in the length of the queues and the
unbalance in the depth of the two sides of the book,
DQ ¼ QB QS
QBþ QS ,
DD ¼ DB DS
DBþ DS .Fig. 2. Mean and standard deviation of the asset 1 optimal allocations of the twelve groups in the settings
with H ¼ 240 and Pcaic ¼ 400. In the upper panel we report the values relative to the case of optimal
allocations determined assuming negative correlations among the assets. In the lower panel we plot the
values corresponding to the case of optimal allocations determined assuming positive correlations among
the assets. Since the optimal weights remain constant over the updating interval ðI ¼ H=GÞ, the data
correspond to time steps of I days.
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Fig. 3. Prices and mean optimal weights generated with positive correlations when H ¼ 240 (upper panel)
and H ¼ 120 (bottom panel).
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Table 1
Summary daily statistics for different settings
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
N-400-240
V 365.534 300.89 2 2030
NT 41.15 22.8 1 141
VT 7.91 3.11 2 21.8
WT 11.89 8.4 3.3 111.3
QB 3.56 3.1 0 19.67
DB 7.81 5.14 0 34.04
QS 3.4 3.02 0 31.67
DS 11 9.22 0 56.70
LR 0.00097 0.081 0.62 0.255
VRET (%) 2.013 3.28 0 76.96
P-400-240
V 589.75 614.61 0 3267
NT 46.34 28.87 0 139
VT 10.15 6.65 0 33.51
WT 15.01 17.95 2.59 186
QB 3.87 3.57 0 24.5
DB 16.40 16.03 0 168.13
QS 3.68 3.92 0 28.5
DS 22.99 24.73 0 241.25
LR 0.000335 0.098 0.69 0.322
VRET (%) 2.233 3.96 0 61.11
P-200-120
V 1026.4 995.8 8 6484
NT 66.79 27.65 4 166
VT 13.66 12.14 1.12 88.07
WT 7.15 6.31 2.22 84
QB 4.94 4.41 0 30.33
DB 26.72 31.05 0 318.1
QS 4.66 4.5 0 31.67
DS 31.8 29.81 0 391.64
LR 0.000198 0.121 0.81 0.335
VRET (%) 1.66 2.19 0 30.55
We display the main variables for the settings N-400-240 (upper), P-400-240 (middle), and P-200-
120 (bottom).
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transactions (WT), on trading volume (V), and on the variables measuring book
unbalances (DQ, DD). We create two dummy variables to capture the impact of the
sign of book unbalances (DMYDQ, DMYDD), and we use both the absolute value and
the square of DQ and DD to allow for non-linearities in the relation between VRET
and the level of book unbalances. Similarly, to capture non-linearities in the relation
between VRET and the trading volume, we add in the regression the square of trading
volume. In total we include nine covariates plus an intercept.
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Results of the linear regression for the settings N-400-240 (upper), P-400-240 (middle), and P-200-
120 (bottom)
Coef. Std. err. t P4jtj CI 95%
N-400-240
WT 0.225 0.1445 15.60 0 0.197 0.2537
V 0.382 0.0903 4.23 0 0.205 0.5594
VSQ 1.756 0.6053 2.90 0.004 2.94 0.5683
DMYDQ 0.0327 0.0187 1.74 0.081 0.004 0.0694
DQABS 0.247 0.1201 2.06 0.04 0.4832 0.119
DQSQ 0.594 0.1227 4.84 0 0.3529 0.835
DMYDD 0.016 0.0189 0.86 0.392 0.0209 0.0532
DDABS 0.0073 0.1085 0.07 0.947 0.2202 0.2056
DDSQ 0.020 0.1242 0.16 0.871 0.2639 0.2234
C 0.265 0.0484 5.47 0 0.3599 0.1699
P-400-240
WT 0.149 0.0061 24.49 0 0.137 0.161
V 0.315 0.0425 7.41 0 0.231 0.398
VSQ 0.982 0.1719 5.72 0 1.32 0.645
DMYDQ 0.0064 0.0195 0.33 0.742 0.032 0.045
DQABS 0.719 0.1303 5.51 0 0.975 0.463
DQSQ 1.227 0.1292 9.50 0 0.974 1.48
DMYDD 0.019 0.0196 0.97 0.333 0.0196 0.0577
DDABS 0.153 0.1118 1.37 0.172 0.067 0.372
DDSQ 0.339 0.1181 2.87 0.004 0.571 0.108
C 0.181 0.0424 4.28 0 0.265 0.098
P-200-120
WT 0.1398 0.0089 15.73 0 0.1224 0.1573
V 0.0382 0.0129 2.96 0.003 0.01286 0.0636
VSQ 0.072 0.0292 2.47 0.014 0.1294 0.0147
DMYDQ 0.0003 0.0103 0.03 0.977 0.02 0.0206
DQABS 0.4426 0.0717 6.17 0 0.5835 0.3018
DQSQ 0.8135 0.0695 11.7 0 0.6771 0.9499
DMYDD 0.0077 0.0105 0.73 0.467 0.0285 0.0130
DDABS 0.1235 0.0647 1.91 0.057 0.2504 0.0034
DDSQ 0.1048 0.0707 1.48 0.139 0.034 0.2436
C 0.0019 0.0238 0.08 0.936 0.0448 0.0486
The adjusted R2 are, respectively, 0.4054, 0.5555, and 0.5421. The values in bold are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The estimates are obtained using samples of 999 observations.
A. Consiglio, A. Russino / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1910–19371926In all three settings, VRET is signiﬁcantly related to the waiting time between
transactions, to volume, and to the level of unbalance in the queues (we look at
values signiﬁcant at the 5% level). VRET is in general increasing in WT, and the
estimated coefﬁcient is higher in the settings characterized by relatively low trading
activity (0:225 in N-400-240 against 0:1398 in P-200-120). The relation between
VRET and volume is inverted U-shaped: VRET is increasing in volume only for
relatively low values of the trading volume. In other words, VRET is increasing in
volume only if the daily volume is lower than a cut-off point V c. For values above
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corresponding to the cut-off point ðV cÞ computed for each setting, we ﬁnd that the
range of values for which VRET is increasing in volume is smaller in the setting with
negative correlations. For example, over 1000 observations the percentage of volume
observations below the cut-off point is 20% in N-400-240 versus 33% in P-400-
240. In summary, we ﬁnd that generally when the trading volume is relatively high,
an increase in volume helps reducing the per-transaction volatility. The negative
relation between the per-transaction volatility and the trading volume is particularly
pervasive in the setting characterized by the lowest average daily trading activity.
Instead, the relation between VRET and the level of unbalance in the queues is
U-shaped. In this case, the level of unbalance in the queues increases the per-transaction
volatility only when the level of unbalance is greater than a cut-off point. The range of
values for which the relation is increasing is greater in the setting with negative
correlations (i.e., over 1000 observations the percentage of observations below the cut-
off point, for which the increasing relation is excluded, is 16:5% in N-400-240 versus
20% in P-400-240). Thus, a minimal level of unbalance in the queues seems to be
beneﬁcial, it is only when the level of unbalance is relatively high that increases in the
unbalance become positively associated with the per-transaction volatility.
We have run the same set of regressions using as a dependent variable the log-
returns (LR). Although we do not report the full results of the statistical analysis for
economy of space, interestingly, we have found that the variables measuring the
intensity of trading activity (e.g. trading volume and number of transactions) are not
signiﬁcant. Only the variables relative to the sign and level of the unbalances between
the two sides of the book are relevant to explain price changes. In particular, we have
found that when the unbalances indicate a more liquid buy side of the book, log-
returns increase and vice versa. That is, as expected, an accumulation of orders on the
buy side of the book indicates a demand pressure and consequently it is associated
with an increase in log-returns. Conversely, an accumulation of orders on the sell side
of the book denotes a pressure to sell pushing down prices. But, high levels of
unbalance between the two sides of the book (measured by DQSQ, and DDSQ) are
negatively associated with log-returns: that is, price changes depend on the unbalance
of the book, and the highest book unbalances typically produce downturn movements,
suggesting that extreme book unbalances are driven by selling waves.
Clearly, the interactions among volatility, trading activity, and market liquidity
are quite complex. To get a more precise idea of those interactions we have run
simultaneous quantile regressions for the 0:05, the 0:5, and the 0:95 quantiles of
VRET. Quantile regression is an extension of the classical linear regression model
which allows to estimate the effect of a set of variables on all parts of the distribution
of a response variable. The estimates obtained are semiparametric in the sense that
no parametric distributional form is assumed for the random error part of the model
(Cade and Noon, 2003; Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
In Tables 3–5, we report the results of the quantile regressions for the three
settings. In general, the variable that affects all the quantiles (q5, q50, and q95) of the
distribution of VRET is the level of unbalance of the queues (DQ). In all three settings,
the waiting time between transactions becomes signiﬁcant in the median quantile
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Results of the quantile regression for the setting N-400-240
Coef. Std. err. t P4jtj CI 95%
q5
WT 0.0016 0.0172 0.0900 0.9280 0.0323 0.0354
V 0.0066 0.0501 0.1300 0.8960 0.0917 0.1048
VSQ 0.0031 0.2581 0.0100 0.9910 0.5096 0.5035
DMYDQ 0.0066 0.0068 0.9700 0.3310 0.0068 0.0201
DQABS 0.1097 0.0428 2.5600 0.0110 0.1936 0.0257
DQSQ 0.2694 0.0608 4.4300 0.0000 0.1501 0.3888
DMYDD 0.0051 0.0079 0.6500 0.5190 0.0103 0.0205
DDABS 0.0331 0.0493 0.6700 0.5020 0.1300 0.0637
DDSQ 0.0286 0.0646 0.4400 0.6580 0.0983 0.1555
C 0.0055 0.0322 0.1700 0.8650 0.0578 0.0688
q50
WT 0.0817 0.0186 4.3900 0.0000 0.0451 0.1182
V 0.0123 0.0461 0.2700 0.7900 0.0782 0.1028
VSQ 0.0502 0.2437 0.2100 0.8370 0.5284 0.4280
DMYDQ 0.0205 0.0060 3.4100 0.0010 0.0087 0.0324
DQABS 0.1653 0.0424 3.9000 0.0000 0.2486 0.0820
DQSQ 0.4911 0.0491 10.0000 0.0000 0.3948 0.5875
DMYDD 0.0106 0.0056 1.9100 0.0560 0.0003 0.0215
DDABS 0.0160 0.0495 0.3200 0.7470 0.1130 0.0811
DDSQ 0.0342 0.0665 0.5100 0.6080 0.1647 0.0964
C 0.0157 0.0309 0.5100 0.6110 0.0764 0.0449
q95
WT 0.2639 0.0466 5.6600 0.0000 0.1724 0.3553
V 0.2328 0.1031 2.2600 0.0240 0.0305 0.4351
VSQ 1.1301 0.5277 2.1400 0.0320 2.1657 0.0945
DMYDQ 0.0139 0.0147 0.9500 0.3420 0.0148 0.0427
DQABS 0.2586 0.1270 2.0400 0.0420 0.5078 0.0094
DQSQ 0.7179 0.1637 4.3800 0.0000 0.3966 1.0392
DMYDD 0.0094 0.0192 0.4900 0.6250 0.0284 0.0472
DDABS 0.3769 0.1670 2.2600 0.0240 0.7046 0.0493
DDSQ 0.4679 0.2332 2.0100 0.0450 0.0102 0.9256
C 0.0713 0.0688 1.0400 0.3010 0.2064 0.0638
The values in bold are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The estimates are obtained using samples of 999
observations. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 100 replications.
A. Consiglio, A. Russino / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1910–19371928ðq50Þ, and in the quantile representing the upper tail of the distribution ðq95Þ. In
N-400-240 and in P-400-240, that are the settings where the trading activity is
on average lower, both volume and the variable measuring the level of unbalance in
the depth of the two sides of the book (DD) are signiﬁcantly related to VRET in the
upper tail of the distribution.
The differences between the coefﬁcient estimated for the three quantiles
are positive and signiﬁcant for both WT and DQSQ, implying that high values of
both variables increase the dispersion of VRET. In N-400-240 and in P-400-240,
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Table 4
Results of the quantile regression for the setting P-400-240
Coef. Std. err. t P4jtj CI 95%
q5
WT 0.0013 0.0031 0.4100 0.6800 0.0048 0.0073
V 0.0084 0.0136 0.6200 0.5380 0.0184 0.0351
VSQ 0.0448 0.0496 0.9000 0.3670 0.1422 0.0526
DMYDQ 0.0003 0.0063 0.0400 0.9680 0.0126 0.0121
DQABS 0.1497 0.0395 3.7900 0.0000 0.2272 0.0722
DQSQ 0.3461 0.0550 6.2900 0.0000 0.2381 0.4541
DMYDD 0.0054 0.0061 0.8800 0.3770 0.0066 0.0174
DDABS 0.0726 0.0586 1.2400 0.2160 0.0424 0.1876
DDSQ 0.1612 0.0806 2.0000 0.0460 0.3195 0.0030
C 0.0012 0.0137 0.0900 0.9270 0.0280 0.0256
q50
WT 0.0452 0.0123 3.6800 0.0000 0.0211 0.0692
V 0.0146 0.0280 0.5200 0.6010 0.0403 0.0695
VSQ 0.0654 0.0873 0.7500 0.4530 0.2367 0.1058
DMYDQ 0.0021 0.0068 0.3100 0.7580 0.0113 0.0155
DQABS 0.2233 0.0447 4.9900 0.0000 0.3111 0.1355
DQSQ 0.5847 0.0525 11.1300 0.0000 0.4816 0.6878
DMYDD 0.0002 0.0067 0.0300 0.9750 0.0129 0.0133
DDABS 0.0212 0.0545 0.3900 0.6980 0.0857 0.1281
DDSQ 0.0546 0.0683 0.8000 0.4250 0.1887 0.0795
C 0.0159 0.0239 0.6600 0.5060 0.0311 0.0629
q95
WT 0.2656 0.0481 5.5300 0.0000 0.1713 0.3600
V 0.2528 0.0664 3.8000 0.0000 0.1224 0.3832
VSQ 0.7464 0.2047 3.6500 0.0000 1.1482 0.3447
DMYDQ 0.0307 0.0150 2.0500 0.0400 0.0600 0.0014
DQABS 0.5248 0.1399 3.7500 0.0000 0.7992 0.2503
DQSQ 1.0515 0.1654 6.3600 0.0000 0.7270 1.3760
DMYDD 0.0125 0.0144 0.8700 0.3830 0.0407 0.0156
DDABS 0.4858 0.1945 2.5000 0.0130 0.8675 0.1040
DDSQ 0.6660 0.3040 2.1900 0.0290 0.0694 1.2626
C 0.0291 0.0613 0.4700 0.6350 0.1494 0.0912
The values in bold are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The estimates are obtained using samples of 999
observations. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 100 replications.
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and negative for VSQ and signiﬁcant and positive for DDSQ. Thus, in the settings
where the trading activity is on average lower, the variance of the distribution
of VRET is affected additionally by variables measuring the trading activity and
the order size. When volume is high the dispersion of VRET decreases, while when
the depths of the two sides of the book are strongly unbalanced the variance
of VRET increases.
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Table 5
Results of the quantile regression for the setting P-200-120
Coef. Std. err. t P4jtj CI 95%
q5
WT 0.0024 0.0048 0.51 0.613 0.0070 0.0119
V 0.0065 0.0047 1.39 0.166 0.0027 0.0157
VSQ 0.0145 0.0096 1.51 0.132 0.0334 0.0044
DMYDQ 0.0024 0.0037 0.64 0.52 0.0049 0.0096
DQABS 0.0967 0.0292 3.31 0.001 0.1541 0.0394
DQSQ 0.2543 0.0390 6.52 0 0.1778 0.3308
DMYDD 0.0010 0.0041 0.23 0.816 0.0071 0.0090
DDABS 0.0228 0.0417 0.55 0.585 0.1047 0.0591
DDSQ 0.0165 0.0562 0.29 0.77 0.0939 0.1268
C 0.0022 0.0099 0.22 0.822 0.0172 0.0216
q50
WT 0.1048 0.0231 4.54 0 0.0595 0.1501
V 0.0177 0.0105 1.69 0.092 0.0029 0.0383
VSQ 0.0372 0.0218 1.7 0.089 0.0800 0.0056
DMYDQ 0.0041 0.0041 0.99 0.32 0.0040 0.0121
DQABS 0.1648 0.0361 4.56 0 0.2357 0.0940
DQSQ 0.4774 0.0442 10.79 0 0.3907 0.5643
DMYDD 0.0019 0.0045 0.42 0.677 0.0069 0.0107
DDABS 0.0158 0.0376 0.42 0.674 0.0579 0.0895
DDSQ 0.0678 0.0524 1.29 0.196 0.1706 0.0350
C 0.0238 0.0190 1.25 0.21 0.0611 0.0134
q95
WT 0.2886 0.0649 4.44 0 0.1612 0.4161
V 0.0158 0.0209 0.76 0.45 0.0252 0.0568
VSQ 0.0260 0.0351 0.74 0.459 0.0950 0.0429
DMYDQ 0.0141 0.0112 1.25 0.21 0.0361 0.0080
DQABS 0.5718 0.1500 3.81 0 0.8661 0.2775
DQSQ 1.0386 0.1687 6.16 0 0.7076 1.3696
DMYDD 0.0217 0.0118 1.84 0.067 0.0448 0.0015
DDABS 0.3240 0.2415 1.34 0.18 0.7978 0.1498
DDSQ 0.4455 0.3736 1.19 0.233 0.2877 1.1787
C 0.0782 0.0668 1.17 0.242 0.0529 0.2092
The values in bold are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The estimates are obtained using samples of 999
observations. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping with 100 replications.
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We have shown that the time series of prices generated using different
combinations of the parameters governing the learning process exhibit different
patterns. The price series are particularly affected by association structure assumed
by the agents. A positive association structure produces intense trading activity and
irregular price series characterized by sudden up and down movements.
We have built a volatility-measure capturing the ability of the market to absorb
trading without strong effects on prices (VRET). We have shown that this variable is
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the book. While a minimal level of unbalance is beneﬁcial (up to a critical point, on
average VRET is negatively related to DQ), high levels of the unbalance in the queues
generally induce an increase in VRET. The cut-off point deﬁning the range of values
for which DQ is positively related to VRET is lowest in the less active setting (N-400-
240). So, it seems that the market settings generating a more intense trading activity
can sustain a higher level of unbalance between the two sides of the book without
adversely affecting the per-transaction volatility. On average VRET is also affected by
the waiting time between transactions and the trading volume. While VRET is
generally increasing in WT, increases in volume are beneﬁcial, that is reduce VRET,
when the daily transaction volume is greater than a critical level. The beneﬁcial effect
of volume is more consistent when the market is generally less active.
The quantile regressions indicate that book unbalances do not affect just the
mean, but the entire distribution of the conditional per-transaction volatility of price
changes. We have estimated the coefﬁcients relative to three quantiles (q5, q50, and
q95) to capture the differential impact of the independent variables on the center and
on the two extreme tails of the distribution of VRET. In all three settings both the
estimated coefﬁcient of WT and DQSQ increase signiﬁcantly when moving from the
low to the high tail of the distribution implying that the dispersion of VRET increases
in both variables. Interestingly, comparing coefﬁcients of DQSQ estimated in the
three settings, we can see that the difference between the upper tail value and the
lower tail value is progressively increasing moving from N-400-240 to P-400-240
and to P-200-120. So, the differential sensitivity of the two tails of the distribution
of VRET to DQSQ becomes more pronounced in the settings characterized by a more
intense trading activity. Additionally, in the setting with a less intense trading
activity, the upper tail of the distribution of VRET is inﬂuenced by the transaction
volume and by the level of unbalance in the depth of the two sides of the book.5. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the interactions between the volatility of price
changes and market liquidity using the data generated simulating an artiﬁcial
electronic market populated by portfolio traders learning over time.
Agents do not have structural knowledge about the economy. In particular, they
do not know the joint distribution of assets’ returns, but they try to learn it using
public observable market data. We assume that, starting from their priors, the
investors use efﬁciently the available information to form their posteriors. Agents
follow a common trading strategy, that is they trade to rebalance their portfolio.
Agents’ preferences are deﬁned over ﬂuctuations in the value of the portfolio of risky
assets. Agents interact through a continuous double-auction market system.
In the model there is no exogenous stochastic process driving the fundamentals.
Thus, the volatility of price changes is endogenously determined by the functioning
of the market system: the agents’actions (that depend on their beliefs), and the rules
governing the interactions between the agents’ actions. In this framework, the issue is
ARTICLE IN PRESS
A. Consiglio, A. Russino / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1910–19371932not to study what agents get to learn, but to understand how the endogenous
component of market volatility is affected by the interaction between the process
through which the distribution of agents’ beliefs changes over time and the market
mechanism.
We have run different simulations changing the parameters governing the learning
process to understand if and how those parameters may affect the volatility of price
changes. We have found that the parameters deﬁning the learning process, such as
the frequency of updating and the returns’ association structure assumed by the
agents, affect signiﬁcantly the interrelationships among price changes, trading
activity, and market liquidity. In particular, we have shown that the variable
measuring the level of unbalance in the length of the queues is fundamental to
explain the jumps in the volatility of price changes. The unbalances between the two
sides of the book affect not only the mean but also the dispersion of the distribution
of the per-transaction volatility. The parameters governing the learning process
affect the intensity of the relation between the per-transaction volatility and the
variables measuring the trading activity and the unbalances between the two sides of
the book.Appendix A. Prior distributions
To simulate a sufﬁciently large set of univariate marginal returns distribution we
use the Johnson translation system (Johnson, 1949). We conﬁne ourselves to the case
of bounded distributions. In this case, the Johnson translation system is deﬁned by
the following cdf:
F ðxÞ ¼ Ffgþ d  g½ðx  xÞ=lg,
with
gðyÞ ¼ log½y=ð1 yÞ,
where the support of the random variable x is ½a; b, F is the standard normal cdf, g
and d are shape parameters, x is a location parameter, and l is a scale parameter. The
density f ðxÞ can take a wide variety of shapes, and, thus, provides a very ﬂexible tool
to generate subjective probability distributions.
In practice, we use the VISIFIT software which offers a visual interactive method
for matching a Johnson bounded distribution to subjective information (see DeBrota
et al., 1988). We specify an upper and a lower bound deﬁning the support of the
returns distribution we are simulating. Then, we choose the mode and the level of
dispersion of the desired distribution. We simulate a set of univariate marginal
distributions (one for each risky asset) for every group of agents, G ¼ 1; . . . ; 12. We
differentiate the groups in terms of their degree of optimism about market
conditions. To identify more optimistic agents we shift the mode of the distribution
towards the upper end of the returns interval, conversely we shift the mode of the
distribution towards zero to get the subjective probability distribution of more
pessimistic agents. To create N ¼ 3 distributions for each group (characterized by a
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whenever we increment the mode.
Using the continuous distribution F ðxÞ, we can compute the relative frequencies of
the C ¼ 40 classes in which we have divided the support of the distribution. Finally,
assuming that the agents have formed their view observing a hypothetical sample ofP
caic observations, we get the absolute frequencies, corresponding to our prior
parameters ða1; . . . ; aCÞ, multiplying the relative frequencies by the assumed prior
sample size.Appendix B. The mathematics of the portfolio model
We provide here an overview of the model (see Consiglio et al., 2004) for a more
general derivation of the model). Denote by T the ﬁnal period of the investor’s
horizon, and with t ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ; T the discrete points in time from today (t ¼ 0)
until T. Let W 0, W

T , and g be, respectively, the initial investor’s wealth, the ending
period target level of wealth, and the growth rate needed to yield W T ¼ W T .
Financial market uncertainty is operationalized as a discrete set of scenarios
denoted by O¼: f1; 2; . . . ; Sg.
The investor chooses a portfolio of the available risky assets that allows him to get
W T ¼ W T . The returns of each asset during the period t  1 to t are denoted by Rsjt,
for each j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N and s 2 O.
The initial wealth W 0 is allocated to assets in proportion hj such thatX
j
hj ¼ 1, (12)
and hjX0. The dynamics of the portfolio value are given by
W st ¼ W st1ð1þ RsPtÞ for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O, (13)
where the portfolio returns at each moment in time t are given by
RsPt ¼
X
j
hjR
s
jt for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O. (14)
To guarantee that at the end of the planning period W T is obtained, the portfolio
value must grow in each period t at rate g,
W st ¼ W t ¼ W 0ð1þ gÞt1 for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T . (15)
The previous equality requires that in each period the portfolio returns
match the target growth rate g. That is, we must infuse money every time a
downside occurs, and we must reduce the current level of the portfolio value when
an upside is experienced. At each moment in time the realized deﬁcit or surplus is
given by
dst ¼ max½ðRsPt  gÞ; 0W t1 for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O, (16)
ust ¼ max½ðRsPt  gÞ; 0W t1 for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O. (17)
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respectively, as
Dst ¼ Dst1 þ dst for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O, (18)
Ust ¼ Ust1 þ ust for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O. (19)
Given (15), the portfolio value evolves as follows:
W st ¼ W st1ð1þ RsPtÞ  ust þ dst for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O. (20)
The max operator in (16)–(17) introduces a discontinuity in the model. To
circumvent this problem we introduce gap variables þst and 
s
t to measure,
respectively, the portfolio returns in excess over the target growth rate, and the short
falls below the target growth rate. They satisfy
aRsPt  g ¼ þst  st for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O, (21)
þst X0; 
s
t X0 for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O. (22)
Only one of these gap variables can be non-zero at any given time and under a given
scenario. Using the gap variables, the dynamics of the value of the deﬁcits and of the
surpluses are modiﬁed as follows:
dst ¼ st W st1 for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O, (23)
ust ¼ þst W st1 for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T and for all s 2 O. (24)
The optimal portfolio will maximize the expected value of the ﬁnal surplus and
minimize the expected value of the ﬁnal deﬁcit. The parameter l weights differently
the importance of the expected deﬁcits: the higher l, the more sensitive is the investor
to losses. In symbols we have
Maximize
x
E½UsT   lE½DsT . (25)
Note that all the constraints are linear except for the expression deﬁning W st ,
which does not enter into the optimization model. Before we formulate the linear
programming model, we can simplify some of the equalities in order to reduce the
dimension of the constraints. As a matter of fact, we can determine the expressions
for UsT and D
s
T analytically, and substitute the relations obtained in the objective
function. The linear programming model becomes:
Maximize
1
N
X
s2O
XT
t¼1
½ðþst  lst Þð1þ gÞt1 ð26Þ
Subject to X
j
hj ¼ 1, ð27Þ
RsPt  g ¼ þst  st for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . T and for all s 2 O, ð28Þ
RsPt ¼
X
j
hjR
s
jt for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . T and for all s 2 O. ð29Þ
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Summary daily statistics for the setting with negative correlations, prior
sample size 400, and investment horizon 240 days (N-400-240); same setting but
with positive correlations (P-400-240); setting with positive correlations, prior
sample size 200, and investment horizon 120 days (P-200-120). The variables
considered are:V the transaction volume
NT the number of transactions
VT the per-transaction volume
WT the average waiting time between transactions
QB the average length of the queue on the buy side of the book
DB the average depth of the buy side of the book
QS the average length of the queue on the sell side of the book
DS the average depth of the sell side of the book
LR the log-returnsVRET the per-transaction volatility of returnsAppendix D. Statistical analysis
D.1. Simple regression
Regressions of the per-transaction volatility of returns, VRET, on variables
measuring the intensity of trading activity and the market liquidity for the three
settings. The independent variables are:WT the average waiting time between transactions
V trading volumeVSQ the square of trading volume
DMYDQ a dummy capturing the sign of the unbalance in the length of the
queues. The variable is equal to 1 if DQ is positive and it is equal to 0
otherwiseDQABS,
DQSQthe absolute value and the square of the unbalance in the length of the
queuesDMYDD a dummy capturing the sign of the unbalance in the depths of the two
sides of the book. The variable is equal to 1 when DD is positive and
equal to 0 otherwise.DDABS,
DDSQthe absolute value and the square of the unbalance in the depths of the
two sides of the bookC a constant term.The results are displayed in Table 2.
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Simultaneous quantile regression of VRET on variables measuring the intensity of
trading activity and the market liquidity in the three settings. We estimate the
following model:
QqðyÞ ¼ aq þ bq;1x1 þ    þ bq;nxn,
where q ¼ 0:05; 0:5; 0:95 denote the chosen quantiles, xi (with i ¼ 1; . . . ; 9) are the
independent variables, and y ¼ VRET.
The results are shown in Tables 3–5.Appendix E. Simulation parameters

number of agents M ¼ 6000;
 number of risky assets N ¼ 3;
 number of trading days T ¼ 2400;
 number of daily time steps K ¼ 360;
 initial cash endowments c0 ¼ Cið0Þ ¼ 1000h, for all i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; M;
 initial endowments of risky assets x0 ¼ xijð0Þ ¼ 50, for all i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; M and
j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N;
 initial prices P0 ¼ Pjð0Þ ¼ 100h, for all j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N;
 number of groups G ¼ 12;
 investment horizon H ¼ 240; 120 days;
 interval between the updating of two groups I ¼ H=G days;
 loss aversion l 2 ½4; 9:5; (
target portfolio return gi ¼
1:5% pessimistic agents;
3% optimistic agents; number of scenario returns S ¼ 1000;
 tick size t ¼ 1% opening price;entering probability f ðDiÞ ¼
0:5Di if 0pDip0:3;
1:83 ðDi  0:3Þ þ 0:15 if 0:3oDip0:6;
0:75 ðDi  0:6Þ þ 0:7 if 0:6oDip1;
1 if Di41;
8>><
>>:0 1positive correlation P ¼
1 0:55 0:44
0:55 1 0:23
0:44 0:23 1
B@ CA;negative correlation N ¼
1 0:40 0:23
0:40 1 0:19
0:23 0:19 1
0
B@
1
CA.
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